The India-Russia relationship is one of the most consequential and least discussed great-power partnerships in contemporary international relations. Forged during the Cold War when the Soviet Union became India’s primary arms supplier and diplomatic backer, deepened through decades of shared strategic interests, and now tested by the most significant European war since 1945, the India-Russia relationship is navigating its most challenging period in recent memory. How it evolves will have significant implications for India’s strategic autonomy, defence capabilities and economic relationships with both Russia and the Western world.
The Historical Foundation of India-Russia Ties
The depth of India’s defence relationship with Russia — and before it, the Soviet Union — is difficult to overstate. India’s military has flown Soviet-designed MiG and Su-series fighter jets for decades. The Indian Army operates thousands of Soviet-era T-72 tanks, BMP infantry fighting vehicles and artillery systems. The Indian Navy has operated Soviet-designed aircraft carriers, submarines and surface combatants. The Brahmos supersonic cruise missile — now one of India’s most prized weapons exports — is a joint Indo-Russian development that would not have been possible without deep technological collaboration.
This hardware dependency — approximately 60-65% of India’s defence inventory is of Russian or Soviet origin — gives Russia extraordinary leverage over India’s military operational capability. Spare parts, maintenance support, upgrades and ammunition for these systems flow primarily from Russia, and any disruption to this supply has immediate operational consequences for India’s armed forces. The Ukraine war has already demonstrated this vulnerability, as Russia’s redirection of its defence industrial capacity toward its own war requirements has created delays in Indian deliveries.
Oil Trade: The Economic Foundation of Wartime Relations
India’s dramatic expansion of Russian oil imports since February 2022 has given the India-Russia economic relationship a new and substantial foundation. Indian refineries have purchased Russian Urals crude at discounts that at their peak reached $25-30 per barrel relative to benchmark Brent crude. The economic benefit to India has been significant — reduced import costs, higher refinery margins and a competitive advantage for Indian refined product exports that have expanded substantially as Indian refineries process cheap Russian crude and export petrol, diesel and aviation fuel to global markets at competitive prices.
Indian oil companies including Indian Oil Corporation, Bharat Petroleum, Hindustan Petroleum and HPCL have all significantly increased their Russian crude intake. Reliance Industries, India’s largest private company, has been a particularly large buyer. The payment mechanism for these purchases — navigating Western sanctions while maintaining banking relationships essential for India’s broader economy — has been a constant challenge, with multiple payment systems tried and found wanting before pragmatic arrangements using third-country currencies and intermediaries were established.
Western Pressure and the Secondary Sanctions Threat
The United States has been explicit and consistent in its warnings to India about the risks of its Russia engagement. American officials — at the highest levels including President Biden and Secretary of State Blinken — have visited New Delhi and made clear that India faces potential secondary sanctions consequences if Indian entities continue facilitating Russian sanctions evasion on a large scale. The United States has sanctioned specific Indian companies and individuals involved in supplying dual-use goods to Russia and has imposed sanctions on vessels involved in the Russian oil trade.
India’s official response has been to resist external pressure on what it characterises as sovereign economic decisions made in India’s national interest while taking sufficient care to avoid the most egregious sanctions violations that would trigger American retaliation. The balancing act has, so far, been largely successful — India’s strategic importance to the United States as a democratic counterweight to China gives New Delhi more latitude than most countries would enjoy in navigating this tension. But the room for manoeuvre is not unlimited, and the risk of escalating secondary sanctions pressure remains real.
Defence Diversification: A Strategic Imperative
The Ukraine war has conclusively demonstrated to India’s strategic community the dangers of single-source dependency in defence procurement. The inability of Russia to guarantee reliable supply timelines for systems India needs — including the delayed delivery of the S-400 air defence system, issues with spares for Su-30MKI aircraft and delays in submarine upgrade programmes — has galvanised the push for diversification that was already underway for strategic reasons related to technology access and self-reliance.
India has accelerated defence procurement from France (Rafale jets), the United States (C-17 transport aircraft, P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, Apache and Chinook helicopters, GE engines for the Indian LCA Tejas programme), Israel (drones, missile systems, electronic warfare) and domestically through the Atmanirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) initiative. The target of 70% domestic content in defence procurement, while ambitious, reflects a genuine strategic consensus that India cannot indefinitely rely on foreign suppliers — particularly from a single country — for its core military capabilities.
The China Variable
The Russia-China strategic partnership — deepened by the Ukraine war as Russia becomes economically dependent on China as a market and supplier — creates a challenging dynamic for India. India is simultaneously a partner of Russia through the India-Russia defence and energy relationship and engaged in a serious military confrontation with China along the Himalayan border. Russia’s growing closeness to China — India’s principal strategic rival — creates a tension at the heart of the India-Russia relationship that both sides acknowledge but neither wishes to resolve by forcing India to choose between them. Managing this three-way dynamic — maintaining useful elements of the Russia relationship while deepening strategic ties with the West and managing the China threat — is the central challenge of Indian foreign policy in the 2020s.